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Chief, Economic Research Area

12 July 1954

Chief, Services Division

Material for General Clark's Investigation

REFERENCE: Ch/B Memo, same subject, dated 12 July 1954

Although I am not sure that we have been able to make a complete analysis of problems of the type indicated in your memorandum, the following appear to be the major ones extant at this time. There is a certain amount of overlap among the problems, but they are set forth separately because they appear to be distinct problems to us, even though they may be caused by overlapping situations elsewhere.

a. Communist Penetration in Southeast Asia, With Specific Reference to Indo-China

Although a great deal of information on the situation in Indo-China is received in Washington, facilities for processing this information have so far proved to be inadequate and such processing as is done is made more difficult by the fact that a great deal of additional information, both raw and processed, is available in Indo-China, but not in Washington. If CRR is to do a thorough research job on those areas of Southeast Asia into which the Communist Bloc is or may be expanding, it will require a much better-organized and more fully staffed information collecting and processing organization than that now existing.

Possible solutions

Possible solutions include a coordinated collection effort in Indo-China, with an expanded staff contributed by all interested agencies and an increase in the resources allocated to the processing of information in Washington.

b. Coordination of All-Source Intelligence Research

No other intelligence research organization in Washington operates on an all-source basis in the same manner as CRR. This means that, frequently, opposite numbers in other agencies are unaware of material to us and to other persons in their agencies, even though the opposite numbers may be cleared to receive such information. This is complicated further by the fact that no other agency is able to do the research in depth on as many subjects as are covered in CRR, yet each agency has a voice in CIC subcommittees; we frequently find that a mediocre or uninformed CIC member can block the progress of work along lines which we know to be sound because of our all-source research in depth.

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Possible solutions

Full clearance for Special Intelligence of all NIC subcommittee members would alleviate part of the problem. The major contribution would be made by a better delineation of responsibility among the agencies which would remove some of the less informed agencies from the veto position.

c. Influence of Agency Policy on the Intelligence Position Taken by Representatives of Other DC Agencies

*still
true
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A particular example of the problem has been a dispute within the Intelligence Community concerning the capability of the Chinese Communist Railway System. We feel, because of policy reform, the military agencies have failed to take an objective position in evaluating the extensive analyses prepared by us on the capabilities of the Chinese Communist railways. Their attitude has frequently been most ~~unconstructive~~. This is still an important substantive issue that might have an important bearing on future US policy.

Possible Solution

A continued fair and ~~unbiased~~ presentation of the facts on the part of CIA may eventually have some influence on this matter and improved delineation of responsibility mentioned above might also help.



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